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Note
REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA:
PROMOTING PATIENT AUTONOMY TO CHOOSE
AVASTIN AND OTHER CANCER DRUGS
SARA J. RAY
On November 18, 2011, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
revoked accelerated approval of the breast cancer indication for Avastin, a
cancer drug manufactured by Genentech. The FDA claims that Avastin,
when used to treat metastatic breast cancer, does not provide a benefit that
justifies the serious and potentially life-threatening risks associated with
its use. The agency concluded that there was insufficient evidence that
Avastin would help women with breast cancer live longer or improve their
quality of life. This decision has sparked controversy and debate among
women who want to keep Avastin available as an option to treat their
breast cancer and view this decision as a death sentence.
This Note discusses the importance of keeping Avastin available as a
treatment option for women with metastatic breast cancer and the
propriety of the FDA’s authority to remove approval of its use in the
treatment of this life-threatening disease. In this Note, I will argue that
there are wide-ranging problems resulting from the current system in
which the FDA is able to regulate serious cancer drugs like Avastin. I
further argue that these problems demonstrate that the FDA should no
longer be the sole regulatory authority for cancer drugs like Avastin and
propose an alternative system of regulation that is better aligned with the
principle of patient autonomy.
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REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA:
PROMOTING PATIENT AUTONOMY TO CHOOSE
AVASTIN AND OTHER CANCER DRUGS
SARA J. RAY
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Cancer Society has estimated that this year in the
United States about 226,870 new cases of invasive breast cancer will be
diagnosed in women, 63,300 new cases of carcinoma in situ (the earliest
form of breast cancer) will be diagnosed, and 39,510 women will die from
breast cancer.1 Excluding skin cancers, “[b]reast cancer is the most
common cancer among American women,” with a woman having slightly
less than a one-in-eight chance of developing invasive breast cancer during
her lifetime.2 With breast cancer being the second leading cause of cancer
death in women, breast cancer holds a prominent place in public health
with a national focus on early detection initiatives, increasing awareness,
and improving treatment.3
In addition to providing general information about breast cancer, the
American Cancer Society provides information on treatment options based
on the opinions and professional experience of the doctors and nurses
serving on its Editorial Board.4 Among some of the available treatments
are surgery, radiation therapy, chemotherapy, hormone therapy, and
targeted therapy.5 Many Americans are familiar with radiation and
chemotherapy as cancer treatment options, but “[a]s researchers have
learned more about the gene changes in cells that cause cancer, they have
been able to develop newer drugs that specifically target these changes.
These targeted drugs work differently from standard chemotherapy

Providence College, B.A., cum laude, 2009; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D.
Candidate 2013. I am thankful to my advisor, Professor Robert Whitman, for reviewing this Note and
providing thoughtful comments and feedback. I am also grateful to my colleagues from the
Connecticut Law Review for their contribution. A special thanks to my family and Christopher
Stankus for their continued support and encouragement.
1
Breast Cancer: What Is Breast Cancer? Topics: What Are the Key Statistics About Breast
Cancer?, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide/breastcancer-key-statistics (last visited July 21, 2012).
2
Id.
3
See id. (discussing decreasing fatality rates from breast cancer since 1990).
4
Breast Cancer: Treating Breast Cancer Topics: How is Breast Cancer Treated?, AM. CANCER
SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide/breast-cancer-treating-general-info
(last visited July 21, 2012).
5
Id.
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drugs . . . [and] are most often used along with chemotherapy.” Although
targeted drugs are a more recent development, targeted therapy is an
attractive treatment option available to those threatened with more serious
and advanced cases of breast cancer.
One such targeted therapy treatment for advanced breast cancer is
Bevacizumab, more commonly known as Avastin.7 Avastin, produced by
the pharmaceutical company Genentech, “first received accelerated
approval by the [FDA]” in 2008 to treat metastatic breast cancer.8 The
data backing the FDA’s approval for the drug indicated that combining
Avastin with chemotherapy extended the time it took for the disease to
progress when compared to chemotherapy treatments alone.9 “As part of
the accelerated approval process, Genentech agreed to conduct further
studies” of the drug to determine whether women taking Avastin indeed
lived longer as a result.10
Although Genentech’s research and development of Avastin to treat
metastatic breast cancer has been ongoing, an advisory committee to the
FDA voted unanimously to remove approval of Avastin for this indication
because recent studies did not show the drug to be safe and effective. 11
The 6-0 vote caused the FDA to rescind its approval,12 which was granted
“under a system” allowing for promising drugs that treat serious diseases
“to [reach the] market more rapidly,” subject to further studies.13 Even
though the approval of Avastin for breast cancer has been rescinded, the
drug can still be prescribed “off-label” to treat breast cancer. Insurers,
however, are now less likely to pay for the drug, “which can cost $88,000 a
6

6
Breast Cancer: Treating Breast Cancer Topics: Breast Cancer Targeted Therapy, AM. CANCER
SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide/breast-cancer-treating-targetedtherapy (last visited July 21, 2012).
7
Id.
8
Rebecca V. Snowden, FDA Advisory Panel Votes Against Avastin for Advanced Breast Cancer,
AM. CANCER SOC’Y (July 20, 2010), http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/news/News/fda-advisory-panelvotes-against-avastin-for-advanced-breast-cancer.
9
Id.
10
Id.; see also Hal Barron, Letter to the Editor, Judging a Cancer Drug: Avastin’s Story,
NYTIMES.COM, (June 1, 2011), http:www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/opinion/102avastin.html (“We
continue to study Avastin . . . [and] believe that women who are trying to control their disease should
retain the autonomy to decide, based on the facts, whether Avastin is right for them.”). Hal Barron is
the chief medical officer and head of global product development for Genentech. Id.
11
Andrew Pollock, F.D.A. Panel Rejects Use of Avastin for Breast Cancer, NYTIMES.COM (June
29,
2011),
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/f-d-a-panel-still-sees-no-benefit-ofavastin-for-breast-cancer/?scp=1&sq=f.d.a.%20panel%20rejects%20use%20of%20avastin&st=cse
[hereinafter F.D.A. Panel Rejects Use of Avastin for Breast Cancer].
12
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Commissioner Statement: FDA Commissioner Removes
Breast Cancer Indication from Avastin Label (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www/fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsr
oom/PressAnnouncements/ucm279485.htm [hereinafter Commissioner Statement].
13
Andrew Pollock, Breast Cancer Patients Plead for Avastin Approval, NYTIMES.COM, (June 28,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/business/29drug.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=breast%20cancer
%20patients%20plead&st=cse [hereinafter Breast Cancer Patients Plead for Avastin Approval].
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year” for one patient. Many claim that this decision effectively results in
a death sentence for women with metastatic breast cancer who “want every
available weapon in [their] arsenal as [they] fight this devastating
disease.”15
This Note discusses the importance of keeping Avastin available as a
treatment option for women with metastatic breast cancer and the propriety
of the FDA’s ability to remove approval for its use in the treatment of this
life-threatening disease. It presents the wide-ranging problems that are
raised by the current system of FDA regulation of serious cancer drugs like
Avastin. It argues that these problems demonstrate that the FDA should no
longer be the sole regulatory agency for cancer drugs like Avastin and
proposes an alternative system of regulation that is more in line with
American values, while preserving the legitimate purposes and goals of the
FDA.
Part II discusses the history of Avastin in the marketplace and the
authority of the FDA to regulate cancer treatments as a means of
promoting public health. This Part looks at the development, approval, and
regulation of Avastin for treatment of metastatic breast cancer, the current
state of Avastin following the FDA’s decision, and the significant effects
that removing FDA approval for Avastin has on women with metastatic
breast cancer. This Part also introduces the current problems and debates
in this area.
Part III analyzes the wide-ranging problems that are raised by FDA
regulation of cancer treatments like Avastin. This Part begins by looking
at the significant burdens placed on individual patient autonomy in
choosing effective forms of treatment under the guidance of a physician.
Second, this Part discusses how FDA regulations have raised political
debate in health care reform by those claiming the government is engaging
in health care rationing when it denies expensive medical treatments to
individuals. Lastly, this Part shows how the FDA’s decision increases the
costs of drug development, slows down the rate of adopting effective new
uses of cancer drugs for serious diseases, and limits the ability of
prescribing physicians to receive useful medical information from drug
developers.
This Part concludes that these problems collectively
demonstrate that the FDA is not the proper body to regulate Avastin and
should no longer have the sole authority to regulate this type of drug.
Finally, Part IV argues that the existing system for Avastin and other
cancer treatments should be modified. This Part focuses on the purposes
of the FDA to demonstrate that while the FDA may be well-suited to
regulate cosmetic drugs, its purposes are frustrated when it regulates
14

F.D.A. Panel Rejects Use of Avastin for Breast Cancer, supra note 11.
Breast Cancer Patients Plead for Avastin Approval, supra note 13 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
15
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cancer drugs like Avastin. Therefore, an alternative system should be
implemented. This Part presents three alternatives that could follow the
implementation of relaxed licensing requirements: (1) reassigning the
regulatory role to patients and physicians through the process of shared
decision making; (2) regulating through voluntary private organizations;
and (3) permitting insurance payors to take charge of regulating once
Avastin passes initial threshold approval from the FDA. This Part
concludes that these proposals better serve the purposes of public health
and thus one of them should be adopted.
This Note concludes that there should be a new scheme enacted to
regulate cancer drugs like Avastin after they satisfy initial threshold
licensing approval by the FDA.
II. THE HISTORY OF AVASTIN AND FDA REGULATION
A. The Development of Avastin for Treatment of Breast Cancer
The pharmaceutical company Genentech developed the drug Avastin
to treat individuals with metastatic cancers. Avastin is currently approved
to treat metastatic colorectal cancer, advanced nonsquamous non-small cell
lung cancer, glioblastoma, and metastatic kidney cancer.16 Avastin is not
chemotherapy, but is a “tumor-starving therapy” designed to control cancer
longer than with chemotherapy alone by prohibiting blood vessels from
accessing a cancer tumor, making the tumor shrink, and keeping it from
spreading.17 Studies have shown that compared with chemotherapy alone,
people taking Avastin with chemotherapy are more likely to “[h]ave their
tumors shrink[,] [k]eep their cancer controlled longer[,] [and] [l]ive
longer.”18 Additionally, “[t]he most common side effects of Avastin are:
nosebleeds, headache, high blood pressure, inflammation of the nose, too
much protein in the urine, taste change, dry skin, rectal bleeding, tear
production disorder, back pain, and inflammation of the skin.”19
The FDA approved Avastin for the treatment of metastatic breast
cancer in 2008 based on a study in which the women who took Avastin
along with chemotherapy experienced a longer duration of stalled cancer
16
AVASTIN: WHAT DOES AVASTIN TREAT?, http://www.avastin.com/patient/index.html (last
visited July 21, 2012).
17
GENENTECH, AVASTIN: GETTING STARTED WITH AVASTIN,
http://www.avastin.com/concatenate/Avastin_Patient_TearPad.pdf?srcUrl=http://prod.avastin.gene.s3.a
mazonaws.com/patient/pdf/20120220/Avastin-GettingStarted.pdf&srcUrl=http://www.gene.com/gene/products/information/pdf/avastin-prescribing.pdf (last
visited Aug. 30, 2012).
18
Id.
19
AVASTIN: WHAT DOES AVASTIN TREAT?, supra note 16. More serious side effects include
gastrointestinal perforation, slow or incomplete wound healing, and serious (sometimes fatal) bleeding.
Id.
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growth than women who underwent chemotherapy treatment alone. In
July 2010, new study results were presented that did not show the same
benefit for women who took Avastin to treat their cancer.21 The FDA
concluded from these results that the risks of the drug outweighed the
benefits in the treatment of metastatic breast cancer and, on December 16,
2010, announced a plan to remove the breast cancer indication for
Avastin.22 Genentech responded by calling for a hearing on the FDA’s
conclusion before the FDA Commissioner, Margaret Hamburg, was to
issue a final decision.23 Rescission of FDA approval means that Genentech
can no longer market Avastin for breast cancer by telling physicians or
patients that the drug may help treat breast cancer, but Avastin will still be
available in the drug market to treat indications for which it remains
approved, such as lung and colon cancers.24 Oncologists will still be able
to prescribe Avastin to treat breast cancer on an “off-label” basis.
Insurance companies, however, are less likely to cover this type of use,
thereby escalating the cost of Avastin to around $88,000 a year for a
typical breast cancer patient.25 There are many who fear that this decision
will greatly hinder the individual’s access to treatment.26
20

Snowden, supra note 8.
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., FDA News Release: FDA Begins Process to Remove
Breast Cancer Indication from Avastin Label (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsr
oom/PressAnnouncements/2010/ucm237172.htm. The study showed that although Avastin seemed to
slow cancer growth for some of the women, it did not help them live longer and they had much more
severe side effects. Id.
22
Id.
23
Commissioner Statement, supra note 12.
24
Snowden, supra note 8. The deputy chief medical officer of the American Cancer Society, Len
Lichtenfeld, MD, recommended women currently taking Avastin to talk to their oncologists about what
course of action to take pending the decision from the FDA. He noted “[t]hese studies and
recommendations do not have any impact on the use of [Avastin] in the treatment of other forms of
cancer where the FDA has given approval, such as colon cancer and lung cancer . . . . This review
applies only to the specific recommendation regarding the use of [Avastin] in the treatment of recurrent
breast cancer.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Plans to Revoke Approval for Breast Cancer Drug, NY TIMES:
PRESCRIPTIONS, (Dec. 16, 2010), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/f-d-a-revokesapproval-for-breast-cancer-drug [hereinafter F.D.A. Plans]; see also Letter from Hal Barron, Chief
Medical Officer and Head, Global Product Development, Genentech to Avastin Patient (Nov. 18,
2011), available at http://www.gene.com/gene/products/information/pdf/avastin_informationforpatient
s.pdf (informing patients that “[t]he FDA’s withdrawal of approval means that some insurers may no
longer pay for Avastin for breast cancer”).
26
See, e.g., Jason Millman, Following Avastin Decision, Republicans Say FDA Rationing Care,
THE HILL: HEALTHWATCH (Dec. 16, 2010, 6:06 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medicaldevices-and-prescription-drug-policy-/134131-following-avastin-decision-republicans-say-fdarationing-care- (sharing breast cancer advocate Susan G. Komen for the Cure’s desire “to be sure that
women who are using Avastin, and for whom it is working, can continue to have access to it, that their
insurers will continue to pay for it and that the drug’s manufacturer, Genentech/Roche, continues
making the drug available to women through its patient support programs” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
21
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It is a rare occurrence for the FDA to remove approval of a drug that
has received accelerated approval.27 By contrast, “[e]uropean authorities
have not revoked Avastin’s approval for” this indication.28 This decision
has been controversial as breast cancer patients and patient advocacy
groups claim that by not keeping the drug approved the FDA “den[ies]
patients a chance at . . . a life-saving therapy.”29 Genentech appealed to the
FDA to keep Avastin available as a treatment option, arguing that
“approval should be retained while [they conducted another] clinical
trial.”30 The FDA responded that since it had already found that the
“benefits of [the drug did not] outweigh the risks, retaining the approval”
during a new study “would not be in the interest of the public health and
would jeopardize the integrity of the accelerated approval program.” 31
Ultimately, the accelerated approval that had been granted by the FDA for
the breast cancer indication was revoked by the Commissioner.32
There are advocates on both sides of the Avastin debate. Some have
urged the FDA “to revoke the approval to maintain the integrity of the
accelerated process.”33 On the other hand, there were “[a]bout a dozen
27

F.D.A. Plans, supra note 25.
Julian Pecquet, FDA Defends Restrictions on Avastin Cancer Drug, THE HILL: HEALTHWATCH
(Jan. 7, 2011, 12:47 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medical-device-and-prescription-drugpolicy-/136617-fda-defends-restrictions-on-avastin-cancer-drug. European authorities, however, “have
recommended restricting” Avastin to be “only used [with one specific] type of chemotherapy,
paclitaxel.” Id.; see also Breast Cancer Drug ‘Still Safe’ for Aussie Women, ABC NEWS (July 22,
2010), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-07-22/breast-cancer-drug-still-safe-for-aussie-women/
914514 (noting that Avastin has remained available in Australia and “continues to be an option for
women” with metastatic breast cancer).
29
F.D.A. Plans, supra note 25. Some have called the FDA’s decision “cost control” or
“rationing” “under the new health care law.” Id.
30
Andrew Pollack, Genentech to Appeal to F.D.A. for Breast Cancer Drug, NYTIMES.COM (June
26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/health/27drug.html [hereinafter Genentech to Appeal]
(arguing that “[e]ven where [the] F.D.A. determines that confirmatory trials do not establish clinical
benefit, withdrawal is not required” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
32
Commissioner Statement, supra note 12. According to the Commissioner: “[Avastin] has not
been shown to provide a benefit, in terms of delay in the growth of tumors, that would justify its
serious and potentially life-threatening risks. Nor is there evidence that use of Avastin will either help
women with breast cancer live longer or improve their quality of life.” Id. However, Commissioner
Hamburg did “encourage Genentech to consider additional studies to identify if there are select
subgroups of women suffering from breast cancer who might benefit from this drug.” U.S. Dep’t
Health & Human Serv., FDA News Release: FDA Commissioner Announces Avastin Decision (Nov.
18, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm280536.htm (internal
quotation marks omitted). In fact, Genentech chief medical officer and head of Global Product
Development, Hal Barron, M.D., said that “[d]espite today’s action, we will start a new Phase III study
of Avastin in . . . previously untreated metastatic breast cancer and will evaluate a potential biomarker
that may help identify which people might derive a more substantial benefit from Avastin.” Genentech,
FDA Commissioner Announces Final Decision on Avastin for Metastatic Breast Cancer
(Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://www.gene.com/gene/news/pressreleases/display.do?method=print&id=13687 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
Genentech to Appeal, supra note 30.
28
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women with breast cancer” who came to Genentech’s hearing in front of
the FDA to testify that “the [drug] does help some women” and “should
[remain] available to them.”34 As the New York Times reported:
“Representatives of advocacy groups for patients with ovarian, kidney and
colon cancer and melanoma also spoke in favor of retaining the breast
cancer approval, saying, among other things, that revocation could
discourage drug development.”35 Some advocates for the drug have called
the hearing a “death trial, not of Avastin but of [the] women who rely on
Avastin to stay alive.”36 As one physician noted prior to the decision,
“[t]he FDA’s decision is not going to be an easy one. It is our hope they
will make that decision with full consideration of the science and the
interests of the public, and the women who have been and will continue to
be diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer.”37
In a society where progress in medicine and the development of
innovative treatments are not just encouraged, but praised, it is hard to
believe that a promising drug like Avastin has sparked so much debate and
controversy.
The choice by the FDA to follow the panel’s
recommendation is a setback for both the development of Avastin and “the
treatment of advanced metastatic breast cancer.”38 This decision is
particularly troublesome when one considers the significant effect that
breast cancer has on women throughout the nation.39 The unyielding views
on both sides of the Avastin debate indicate that there are significant policy
themes underlying this issue.
B. The FDA’s Authority to Regulate
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) of 1938 was a
“complet[e legislative] overhau[l of] the public health system . . .
authori[zing] the FDA to demand evidence of safety for new drugs, issue
standards for food, and conduct factory inspections.”40 The FDCA has a
substantial impact on food and drug products in the United States today,
34
Andrew Pollack, Cancer Survivors Appeal to F.D.A. over Avastin, NY TIMES: PRESCRIPTIONS
(June 28, 2011, 1:27 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/cancer-survivors-appealto-f-d-a-over-avastin.
35
Id.
36
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37
Dr. Len, FDA Advisors Vote Unanimously That Avastin Approval Should be Withdrawn, and
You Could Hear the Pain, AM. CANCER SOC’Y: DR. LEN’S CANCER BLOG (June 29, 2011),
http://www.cancer.org/AboutUs/DrLensBlog/post/2011/06/29/FDA-Advisors-Vote-UnanimouslyThat-Avastin-Approval-Should-Be-Withdrawn-And-You-Could-Hear-The-Pain.
38
Todd Zwillich, FDA Panel Opposes Avastin for Breast Cancer: Advisory Panel Recommends
That Avastin be Dropped as a Breast Cancer Drug, WEBMD HEALTH NEWS (June 29, 2011),
http://www.webmd.com/breast-cancer/news/20110629/fda-panel-opposes-avastin-for-breast-cancer.
39
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
40
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Regulatory Information: Legislation,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/default.htm (last visited July 21, 2012).
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regulating $1 trillion worth of products per year. Under the authority of
the Act, the FDA governs how pharmaceutical drugs like Avastin acquire
approval to be sold and how they are subsequently regulated in the
marketplace.42 The FDCA prohibits the introduction of any new drug into
interstate commerce unless the drug has been filed with and approved by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.43
The Act establishes the power of the FDA44 and authorizes the
Secretary “to conduct examinations and investigations for the purposes of
[the Act] through officers and employees of the Department.”45 A “drug”
under the Act is broadly defined as “articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease . . . intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body.”46 One who uses drugs
in violation of the Act is subject to penalties, such as the seizure and
destruction of the drugs,47 injunctions against further use of the drugs,48
fines, or imprisonment.49 The FDA has thus been conferred broad
authority under the FDCA to regulate in this area.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (“CDER”) “promotes and protects the health of Americans
by assuring that all prescription and over-the-counter drugs are safe and
effective.”50 The CDER has the important task of evaluating all new drugs
before they enter the market and monitoring more than 10,000 drugs
currently on the market to make sure they continue to meet high
standards.51 The Center’s evaluations provide doctors and patients with
information that enables them to use medicines wisely, and the CDER
continues to develop its drug safety program to ensure that drugs are used
safely once they are approved.52 The Center also ensures that both brandname and generic drugs work correctly and that their health benefits
outweigh their known risks.53
Under the FDCA, a new drug is approved for a specified and intended
41

Id.
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
43
Id. § 355(a)–(b).
44
Id. § 393.
45
Id. § 372.
46
Id. § 321(g)(1).
47
Id. § 334.
48
Id. § 332.
49
Id. § 333(a)–(b).
50
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH:
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE DRUG USE, PUBLICATION NO. FS 01-3 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE DRUG USE] (emphasis omitted).
51
Id.
52
U.S. FDA, Drugs: CDER: The Consumer Watchdog for Safe and Effective Drugs, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143462.htm
(last visited July 21, 2012).
53
Id.
42
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use after a manufacturer provides sufficient evidence that the drug is safe
and effective for the medical condition prescribed, recommended, or
suggested on the label.54 Drug companies seeking to sell and distribute a
drug must undergo a rigorous two-step approval process: an Investigational
New Drug (“IND”) application followed by a New Drug Application
(“NDA”).55 This process first requires a drug manufacturer to conduct
investigations on the effect of the drug on animals to discover how the
drug works and whether it is likely to be safe and effective for humans. 56
Once this is shown, the drug can then be tested for safety in human clinical
trials after the manufacturer submits the IND application.57
Once an IND application is approved, the drug must undergo clinical
trials. Tests are performed to establish whether the drug will safely treat a
disease and whether it will provide health benefits.58 Once testing is
completed, the drug manufacturer may then submit an NDA to introduce a
new drug product into the U.S. market.59
Drug companies who wish to market, sell, and distribute a drug in the
United States must “test it and submit evidence [to the CDER] that it is
safe and effective” for its intended use.60 The Center then employs its own
team of physicians, statisticians, chemists, pharmacologists, and other
scientists to review the company’s data and proposed labeling.61 This
process is designed to be an independent and unbiased review of the test
data to establish that a drug’s health benefits indeed outweigh its known
risks; however, the Center does not itself test drugs.62 The Center instead
conducts research into the drug’s quality, safety, and effectiveness before
permitting testing in humans. After human testing is completed, if the drug
meets all of the Center’s standards, it is then approved for marketing, sale,
and distribution in the United States, subject to the Center’s determination
about what the label should say about directions for use, side effects, and

54

21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006).
See U.S. FDA, Drugs: Development & Approval Process (Drugs): How Drugs Are Developed
and Approved, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/defaul
t.htm (last visited July 21, 2012) [hereinafter How Drugs Are Developed and Approved] (discussing the
process of drug development).
56
U.S. FDA, Drugs: Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm (last visited July 21,
2011) [hereinafter Development and Approval Process].
57
How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, supra note 55.
58
Development and Approval Process, supra note 56.
59
How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, supra note 55.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Development and Approval Process, supra note 56.
55
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warnings.
Although the CDER asserts that it “continues to facilitate development
of new drugs and new uses for already-approved drugs,” in 2002 the
approval of truly new drugs was at its lowest level in a decade.64 In
response to these figures, the Center took steps “to remove barriers to
innovation in drug development and to facilitate the modernization of
American drug manufacturing” by launching new initiatives.65
Specifically in the area of cancer drug approvals, the FDA’s Office of
Oncology Drug Products “is committed to facilitating rapid development,
review, and action on promising new cancer therapies . . . [providing] the
basis for accelerating introduction of new treatments for cancer into
practice.”66 The FDA also recognizes that “[s]peeding the development
and availability of drugs that treat serious diseases benefits everyone,
especially when the drugs are the first available treatment or have
advantages over existing treatments.”67
The FDA is mindful of the fact that it can take a long time—often
years—to study a new drug and discover whether it provides a real benefit,
such as living longer or feeling better.68 Thus for certain serious or lifethreatening diseases, the FDA has the power to grant accelerated approval
for a drug under the Accelerated Approval regulation, which allows for
drugs that treat serious diseases to receive earlier approval, based on a
“surrogate endpoint.”69 Post marketing clinical trials must then verify the
predicted clinical benefit for the FDA to grant traditional approval for the
drug.70 By using the surrogate, the drug’s approval process can be
shortened considerably, saving valuable time instead of waiting to learn if
a drug actually extends one’s survival.71 If the confirmatory trial does not

63
U.S. FDA, Drugs: New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Appro
valApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last visited July 21, 2012).
64
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67
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Priority Review, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudien
ce/ForPatientAdvocates/SpeedingAccesstoImportantNewTherapies/ucm128291.htm (last visited July
21, 2012).
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Id. (“This real improvement is known as a ‘clinical outcome.’”).
69
Id. A surrogate endpoint is not conclusive of a drug’s benefit, but “represents a clinically
meaningful outcome, such as survival or symptom improvement. The use of a surrogate endpoint can
considerably shorten the time required prior to receiving FDA approval.” Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.

2012]

REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA

331

show the drug provides a clinical benefit, the FDA can then remove the
drug from the market under its regulatory procedures.72
The FDA has several policies and procedures that give the public the
impression that it is dedicated to medical progress, such as the accelerated
approval process. This commitment is particularly noteworthy in the
FDA’s Office of Oncology, which helps oversee Avastin for breast cancer.
The current discussion around Avastin seems to be contrary to the FDA’s
philosophy, however, as its recent decision halts the development and
manufacturing of Avastin for metastatic breast cancer. The effect of the
FDA’s decision ultimately is to hinder innovation in the development of
this drug for that indication and cripple its manufacturing by Genentech.
While the FDA claims to be justified in its reasons, this action is contrary
to its advertised commitment to “facilitating rapid development, review,
and action on promising new cancer therapies.”73
III. PROBLEMS RAISED BY FDA REGULATION OF AVASTIN
A. Limitations on Patient Autonomy and the Problem of Paternalism
The principle of autonomy is one of self-rule or self-determination,
which regards individuals as the sole and exclusive owners of their
person.74 Put another way, autonomy allows an individual to use his or her
body and natural faculties in ways that do not infringe on the autonomy or
liberty of others.75 There has been a longstanding tension between
individual autonomy and social control because a rigid adherence to the
principle of autonomy inhibits the ability of the state to organize the
provision of public goods.76 While government regulations deal with many
public goods and common problems, the principle of autonomy influences
“the decisions that individuals make over their own bodies” and has been
used by patients to guide decisions regarding medical treatments,
particularly in the area of life-threatening illnesses like metastatic breast
cancer.77
There are two components of patient autonomy: rejection and
acceptance of medical treatment. Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously
described this principle nearly a century ago when he wrote:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
72
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to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages . . . . This is true, except in cases of emergency
where the patient is unconscious, and where it is necessary to
operate before consent can be obtained.78
Individuals may use the principle of personal autonomy defensively to
refuse medical treatment that others conclude will benefit them. By
contrast, the offensive use of autonomy—or “the right to accept treatment
with consent—has been widely rejected today.”79 As Professor Epstein
observed, “[the] ability to reject treatment [is] in . . . tension with claims
for modest paternalism on the ground that health, not [individual patient]
autonomy, is the paramount social end.”80 While a mentally competent
adult patient has a near absolute right to refuse treatment where there is no
harm to others,81 no individual has a right to demand whatever medical
treatment or drugs he wishes to receive. The FDA must license a drug
before it can be made available for general sale or use by the public.82 The
distinction between the patient’s right to accept or reject treatment is what
shapes the role of the FDA in American law today.83
Respect for a patient’s autonomy in making medical decisions is a
fundamental value in bioethics. This is so because the field of bioethics
developed alongside a conceptual shift away from paternalism and towards
respect for patient autonomy as the center of the physician-patient
relationship.84 One manifestation of the right to reject medical treatment
was the rise of the doctrine of informed consent. Today, decision-making
power has shifted from physicians to patients, who obtain medical
information to guide their decisions on what procedures to undergo, what
risks to accept, and what pain to endure.85 This doctrine has longstanding
roots found in the visions of autonomy articulated by political theorists:
In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is
necessary that general rules should for the most part be
observed, in order that people may know what they have to
expect; but in each person’s own concerns, his individual
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (citations omitted).
Against Permititis, supra note 76, at 2.
80
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172, 172 (2011).
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See Baily, supra note 81, at 172 (discussing the conceptual shift from paternalism to patient
autonomy in the physician-patient relationship).
85
Of the FDA and IRBs, supra note 74, at 568.
78
79

2012]

REDUCING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE FDA

333

spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid
his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be
offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he
himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely to
commit against advice and warning, are far out-weighed by
the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they
deem his good.86
While informed consent promotes the second part of individual
autonomy—the right to accept potentially harmful medical
treatments—there is currently an uneven acceptance of this part of the
autonomy principle that has manifested in the area of drug regulation.
FDA regulation of Avastin is an example of this problem.
It is argued herein that the FDA regulation of drugs restricts one’s
personal liberty. The FDA has the power to keep cancer drugs off the
market, “thereby limiting the scope of autonomous choices” for individuals
with this disease.87 The normal principles of individual autonomy do not
apply until a drug makes it to the marketplace; no individual is entitled to
use any drug unless the FDA has approved it for sale and distribution.88
Once a drug enters the market, however, it may be used for any purpose for
which it has not received FDA approval because the FDA does not have
the power to regulate the practice of medicine. The FDCA provides that
the FDA does not have the authority to “limit or interfere with the
authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe” any medication that has
received FDA approval.89 Such uses are considered “off-label” and are the
only kind for which Avastin may be used to treat advanced breast cancer.90
Although the FDCA allows a physician to prescribe Avastin for an offlabel use, the Act still prohibits drug manufacturing companies like
Genentech from promoting Avastin for that purpose, which is illegal under
the Act.91 The law even goes as far as to prevent drug companies from
warning physicians and the public about any negative side effects of their
products, in hopes that the warning will not be misconstrued as implied
approval from the FDA to use the drug.92 Such regulations impair both
patients and physicians from gathering the necessary information to make
informed treatment decisions together.
Arguably, patients have the right to determine their medical treatment
based on the doctrine of informed consent. Under this doctrine, a patient
86
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should be able to choose his or her medical care “if given sufficient
information to understand the consequences, risks and benefits, and
alternatives to the chosen medical treatment.”93 But under present rules,
informed consent is insufficient to allow the distribution of experimental
drugs outside the clinical testing context; therefore, patients cannot choose
to take a potentially life-saving drug like Avastindespite being fully
informed of its consequences, risks, and the alternativessimply because
the FDA has not approved it.94 The FDA’s response to criticisms of this
policy is that they regulate drugs to protect the public.95 The FDA thus
takes a paternalistic role when it chooses for patients whether the benefits
of Avastin sufficiently outweigh the risks to justify its accessibility for
their condition.
But such a paternalistic approach denies patient
autonomy.96
The FDA justifies its restrictive policies as necessary to ensure that a
drug’s benefits outweigh its risks before granting approval for sale and
distribution. Some argue that the FDA goes too far when it errs on the side
of safety in regulating drugs.97 One critic describes the FDA’s risk-adverse
behavior:
If [FDA officials] approve a drug and one person in a million
dies of it, they get the blame. But if they keep [the drug] off
the market and a thousand people die for lack of it, they will
still be seen as just doing their job, and groups . . . will still
hail them for “protecting Americans from unsafe and
ineffective drugs.”98
For this reason, the FDA does not have an incentive to allow patients
to take their chances with drugs like Avastin, but it has every incentive to
deny patients access to the drug, even when the potential benefits to the
individual are high.99 This directly conflicts with the central belief of the
autonomy principle that competent individuals, with the advice of their
families, friends, and professionals, can “make better decisions about their
own health care than any government agency that seeks to protect them
from their mistakes.”100
The present debate in modern drug regulation centers on whether the
93
Thad Brady, Note, Paternalism vs. Patient Autonomy: Is the FDA’s “Mothering” Smothering
Grandma’s and Grandpa’s Choice of Prescription Drugs?, 14 ELDER L.J. 393, 405 (2006).
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FDA should continue in its role as a public gatekeeper, or be given a more
modest role where it merely certifies drugs like Avastin as “safe and
effective.”101 This change would remove the FDA’s monopoly position
over potentially life-saving cancer treatments, while maintaining its ability
as an agency to provide advice on which drugs to use and which to
avoid.102 The effect of such a change would be to inhibit government
agencies from blocking voluntary personal decisions.103 Although FDA
regulations are directed at pharmaceutical companies like Genentech, their
effects are felt by the individuals who can no longer purchase and use
drugs. The FDA thus substitutes its own judgment for that of individuals
when it prevents them from assuming the risks of certain treatments in the
hopes of receiving some health benefit.104
Why should the FDA not loosen its controls on the initial licensing,
marketing, and use of drugs like Avastin to encourage the sharing of
information between drug manufacturers, physicians, and patients? This
would in turn speed up the process by which more and improved drugs
enter the market.105 The FDA should not be able to ban drugs, but should
instead be in the business of warning consumers. This is because banning
drugs requires the FDA to make judgments about risks and benefits that
apply to everyone, regardless of individual circumstances.106 The
government should not be in the business of life and death decisions; rather
citizens, as autonomous individuals, should be free to make treatment
decisions for themselves.107 Individuals’ autonomy rights should be given
the same level of respect whether they are requesting or rejecting treatment
because the FDA cannot determine the odds of health benefits better than
individual patients equipped with their physician’s advice.108
The challenge to individual autonomy and problem of paternalism that
is raised by FDA regulation of cancer drugs suggest that the current system
is inadequate for the regulation of Avastin. American Cancer Society
statistics show that despite widespread use of the proven therapies of
surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, and hormone therapy, 1,500 people will
die of cancer every day.109 The FDA’s current policy objective is to
guarantee that cancer sufferers only employ so-called “proven methods” of
101
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treatment and are not tricked into using non-approved drugs that can be
potentially dangerous.110 As former Senator Bob Dole stated, “In a free
market system, it seems to make sense to make available non-harmful
alternative medical treatments to individuals who desire such treatments,
without the Federal Government standing in the way.”111 There seems to
be an inherent injustice in denying cancer patients the medical liberty to
attempt to save their own lives. To promote autonomy and justice for
individuals, the current system needs to be modified so the FDA no longer
has sole regulatory power over Avastin and other cancer drugs.112
B. The Health Care Rationing Debate
Historically, the three pillars of comprehensive health care reform have
been access, quality, and cost. Current health reform politics have focused
on cost by framing the issue as “getting good value for the money
spent.”113 Rationing has always been present in the health care system.
Some rationing is inevitable because of limited resources; it is reasonable
to manage collective resources when most people believe that there is no
benefit of a certain treatment.114 Bioethicists argue that when the judgment
that a treatment provides no benefit is not unanimous, the denial of care
results not from the elimination of harmful care, but from rationing.115 A
claim of government rationing is thus raised when the FDA claims Avastin
does not provide a health benefit to women with metastatic breast cancer,
while women who suffer from the disease advocate that it could provide a
benefit in their individual case.
Rationing has been defined as a “method of allocating resources.”116
This definition, however, does not reflect the way in which the term is
currently used by health reformers. Today, the use of the term in politics
refers to some type of patient harm that occurs by denying resources to
patients.117 Claims that rationing is taking place in “death panels” are hotly
debated today.118 As one scholar put it:
The current clinical and political fears about rationing are
that efforts to slow the rate of growth in health care
expenditures will harm patients. Under this scenario,
110
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rationing need not be explicit . . . . Should rationing occur, it
is likely to be from inaction without the fingerprints of any
specific actor . . . with myriad effects on different
populations.119
Such rationing can be seen in the FDA’s decision to deny approval of
Avastin for breast cancer.
Rationing can be described as both “explicit” and “implicit.” Implicit
rationing is a result of government accident or inaction, while explicit
rationing occurs by design.120 When the government acts in a way that
prevents a medical care transaction from taking place that otherwise would
have, it generates harm to a patient.121 There is, therefore, the potential for
patient harm under both explicit and implicit rationing when cost is a factor
in denying treatment.122 Some consider the denial of insurance payment
for Avastin to be rationing under this view.123 The FDA, in denying
approval of Avastin for the breast cancer indication, effectively gives
insurance companies reason to deny payment for this treatment option.
Women are then forced to pay for this costly drug out-of-pocket, inhibiting
the medical care transaction that would have occurred from taking place
for all but a select few who can afford it.
By contrast, some do not consider this rationing because they do not
agree there is patient harm in denying a treatment that has failed to show
definitive net benefits in clinical trials.124 Under this view, rationing is
achieved explicitly by price. Insurance payors effectively tell patients
“[y]ou want [Avastin] for your breast cancer, but this insurance plan does
not cover an ineffective and potentially harmful drug.”125 Without proven
health benefits, these individuals do not see this as creating patient harm,
which they consider necessary for rationing to occur.126
The flaw in this reasoning is that it associates the requisite patient
harm needed for rationing to occur with a denial of the benefits of a
treatment. Since no benefits have been proven in clinical trials, denial of
insurance payment for Avastin is not rationing in their eyes.127 The group
that views the FDA decision as rationing is correct, however, when one
considers that the actual patient harm in this instance is not the denial of a
treatment with unknown or unproven benefits, but rather the denial of the
autonomous decision of the patient to assume the risk of taking Avastin to
119
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pursue a chance at survival.
By removing its approval of Avastin, the FDA is engaging in implicit
rationing and furthering the occurrence of explicit rationing by insurance
companies. Denial of approval for Avastin is implicit rationing because
the FDA’s inaction in not approving the drug for breast cancer affects
those whose insurance will in turn refuse to cover treatment payments.
The FDA additionally incentivizes insurance payers to engage in rationing
when a patient wants to take Avastin off-label to treat her breast cancer,
but her insurance plan “does not cover an ineffective and potentially
harmful drug.”128
Private insurers are forced to ration care because they have limited
resources in a society of virtually boundless demand. No private insurer
can survive without engaging in rationing because “[t]he essence of
[managed care] is that salaries and profits are limited by the [managed care
organization’s] fixed membership fees.”129 As one scholar noted, “[t]he
problem of [a] fixed revenue” stream is further exacerbated by “failure to
effectively address limitless demand.”130 As a result, private insurers
attempt to coerce physicians into limiting the treatment options they make
available to their patients.131 Government and private insurers who cannot
afford to pay high prices for treatments are thus in constant conflict with
patients who desire to consume expensive care.132 The government and
insurers need to develop alternative approaches to rationing that
incorporate greater process for those who are denied access to medical
care, since rationing restricts the individual’s liberty interest of being able
to choose any treatment option for one’s condition.
Because the United States is a market-based system, rationing is
achieved primarily by allocating resources like Avastin to those who are
most willing to pay.133 This effectively forces those who are unable to pay
the high price of these treatments out of the market, denying them access to
the drugs they need. Rationing by price is an effective means of rationing
medical care because it excludes individuals from participating in market
transactions, but limits consumption against the patient’s will.134
A better method of rationing is rationing by quantity, which focuses on
limiting access to treatments like Avastin over time. Under this system,
the government or private insurers set limits on an individual’s access to
care options “by artificially limiting the quantity of that care available for
128
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135

consumption.”
Price rationing permits the wealthy to have access to
drugs that may have little benefit to them relative to their cost while
denying the poor this same option. A system of rationing by quantity,
however, gives preferential treatment to procedures that maximize public
health relative to their costs.136 Under this form of rationing, the
government sets clear limits on the amount of consumption per individual
without engaging in a cost effectiveness analysis.137 This system reflects
the value underlying recent health care legislation that all individuals
should have access to health care, not just those who can afford it.
FDA approval of Avastin for the breast cancer indication would not
result in wasteful spending by insurance payers in a quantity rationing
system because insurance payers could still place limits on the amount of
treatment available per individual. In a price-rationing system, medical
allocations are effected by the government, resulting in reduced
consumption of health care by those with insufficient insurance. By
contrast, quantity rationing occurs when the private sector sets limits on an
individual’s access to high-cost drugs like Avastin “by artificially limiting
the quantity of . . . care available for consumption.”138 Quantity rationing
is thus more justified than price rationing by “controlling total
expenditures” rather than “excluding a class of individuals from coverage
entirely.”139
Many scholars have theorized about whether all members of society
should have access to “very expensive life-extending care at the end of
life.”140 Avastin, which costs up to $90,000 per treatment, is estimated to
add “only an additional 1.5 months” to one’s life expectancy, making it
cost approximately $720,000 per year of life.141 This high cost raises the
question of whether medical spending at the end of life is justified or
should be viewed as “unconstrained.”142 A moral dilemma is raised as to
what a “just” and “caring” society ought to do when we have the medical
technology that can add time to an individual’s life, “but that technology is
135
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not affordable to [those] who [require] that care.” As one scholar asked,
“[a]re we morally obligated as a just and caring society to provide access at
social expense to these cancer drugs for all these terminally ill cancer
patients? How high a priority (morally speaking) ought funding these
drugs have . . . ?”144
We should not accept the view that “we [have a moral obligation] to
spend any amount of money to save all lives or life-years that medical
technology permits.”145 This would not be just or compassionate in a
society of limited resources that needs “to meet virtually unlimited health
care needs.”146 But this does not mean that patients do not have a right to
the health care treatments they need. It is not immoral to ration the health
care that society provides to terminally ill patients.147 But since the need
for health care rationing cannot be avoided, “it is morally better [for
society] that [these] decisions be visible and rationally self-imposed,”
rather than imposed by the FDA. It is better for society to make these
decisions using “rational and fair processes of democratic deliberation.”148
There are certain limits to patient autonomy. It is undisputed that there
is an ethical difference between refusing and demanding
treatment—individuals do not have “unlimited choice [to receive care] at
the expense of other[s].”149 But the problem of rationing arises when the
FDA substitutes its judgment for that of the public in determining what
standard of care should be available to all. Since individual values and
preferences differ, society needs to develop a consensus and compromise
on what options to provide under a “cost-conscious standard of care.”150
There is no definitive substantive standard to settle the conflicting
judgments about whether certain treatments are sufficiently cost-worthy to
be covered by insurance.151 A fair process would consider insurance
coverage in light of a drug’s effectiveness and expense.152 These processes
should be “fair,” “open,” and allow decision makers “to hear the case for
all [the different] views.”153
Society should not let “the emotional power and sympathy that
surrounds . . . the end of life” or “the insurance effect” cause it to place a
high value on “all demands and desires for life extending care at the end of
143
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life.”
Rationing decisions are more legitimate when it is acknowledged
that terminally ill patients “represent our future possible selves,” and
decisions are “public” and “self-imposed.”155 To achieve “fair rationing,”
society should deliberate through the democratic process, instead of blindly
relying on the FDA’s licensing decisions to determine rationing
outcomes.156 The FDA is therefore not the proper agency to be regulating
drugs like Avastin.
C. Costly Information and Burdens on Physicians
The FDA’s decision to remove its approval of Avastin to treat
metastatic breast cancer results in reduced use of Avastin for that
indication because physicians now must prescribe the drug off-label to the
patients that desire this treatment option. While no law prohibits
physicians from prescribing drugs off-label, “drug manufacturers may not
[legally] promote their products for off-label uses.”157 Such a ban on offlabel promotion raises social policy concerns as it increases the costs of
drug development, slows down the rate of adopting effective new uses of
Avastin for serious diseases, and limits the ability of patients and
prescribing physicians to receive useful medical information from drug
developers like Genentech.158
Off-label uses of drugs are both widespread and beneficial in modern
medicine. Such use occurs when a physician prescribes a pharmaceutical
product at a dose and/or for a condition that the FDA has either not
reviewed or not approved.159 Manufacturers are regulated in the type of
promotion for off-label uses they are permitted to engage in because offlabel drug use imposes enhanced risks without proven benefits.160 So
while the FDA cannot restrict physicians from prescribing drugs like
Avastin to their patients off-label, they do have the authority to forbid drug
companies from promoting their drugs for off-label purposes.161 The
FDCA does not address the practice of off-label promotion; however, the
154
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DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ucm280533.htm
(last visited July 21, 2012).
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Osborn, supra note 157, at 306.
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Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals
and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 225 (2011).
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FDA considers off-label promotion to be violative of the part of the Act
that bans pharmaceutical manufacturers from introducing a new drug into
interstate commerce unless it has received FDA approval.162
When a drug label is based on clinical studies for specific indications,
the possibility that the drug may work in other clinical situations is high;
this is why off-label application is among the most prevalent in the
treatment of cancer.163 Off-label applications of cancer drugs have been
called “the hallmark of state-of-the-art treatment.”164 The National Cancer
Institute and many publications encourage off-label use of cancer drugs as
being reasonable, particularly in the cases of rare cancers where there is no
existing treatment and when there is substantial evidence, but no FDA
approval.165 In instances where off-label use benefits patients, “off-label
marketing [and promotion] may enable the greatest number of potential
beneficiaries to [learn about the treatments that are] best suited to their
needs.”166
There are circumstances where off-label use to treat certain cancers is
evidence-based. Sometimes, off-label use arises from post-marketing
studies as physicians experiment with the drug after it is approved for the
original indication.167 If additional efficacy is shown, the drug label can be
modified to reflect the new indication if the manufacturer submits a formal
application to the FDA that justifies the new use with data.168 Gaining
FDA approval requires companies to invest in gathering evidence and
conducting clinical trials, a process that involves significant cost and
time.169 Drug companies who fear that a bad review from the FDA will
negatively affect their on-label prescription sales may be dissuaded from
engaging in the process at all.170 Even off-label uses that could generate a
lot of revenue may not be pursued if the manufacturer does not want to risk
these adverse effects. Such fears demonstrate that many off-label uses may

162

Id.
Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 193 (1999). But, if a
manufacturer wants an off-label use to be added to a drug’s labeling, it must apply to the FDA for
approval as if it were submitting a new drug. Id. at 187–88.
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Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Kesselheim, supra note 159, at 235.
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Salbu, supra note 163, at 194.
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Kesselheim, supra note 159, at 237.
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Id. This formal application is called a supplemental New Drug Application. Id.
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Id. “The administrative process at the FDA can take many months.” Id.; see also Salbu, supra
note 163, at 188 (“‘[T]he manufacturer of a drug with potential multiple uses confronts the prospect of
having to surmount the obstacles to FDA approval several times before it can exploit the full market
potential of the drug.’ Of course, inclusion of a new use in the drug’s labeling may not increase
sales . . . [so] companies have little incentive to apply for labeling authorization under tedious and
expensive FDA procedures.”).
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be beneficial even where they have not gained FDA approval.
The FDA’s policies are restrictive of drug companies like Genentech
who need to promote their products directly to physicians and to patients in
order to spur increased use of their products.172 A competitive market
prompts manufacturers to initiate increased patient and physician use of
their products to recover their costs of R&D and generate revenue for
further development. Increased revenue gives manufacturers the ability
not just to discover new drugs, but to develop those already present in the
market for other indications as a way of promoting efficient development.
Discussing their products with patients and physicians gives companies the
ability to see how their products affect patients for these other uses,
thereby reducing the costs of conducting additional clinical trials. Such
work is desirable for patients who require a reactive and constantly
improving drug market to treat their ever-changing needs.
Drug manufacturers fund the R&D of new drugs through high drug
prices.173 In order to offset the high costs of R&D and to generate funding
to develop new drugs, drug manufacturers have an incentive to develop
“‘blockbuster’” drugs with high annual sales.174
Biotechnology
pharmaceutical companies are relatively new to the pharmaceutical
industry, but experience the same challenges in researching and developing
new drugs.175 It has been estimated that the American biotechnology drug
market exceeds $60 billion annually.176 However, this industry is
perceived as dangerous for investors because many of these companies
struggle to be profitable after they invest millions in researching new
drugs.177
The regulations imposed by the FDA are aimed at preventing drug
companies from promoting unapproved uses of their products, as such uses

171
Id. Other examples where off-label use may be reasonable and beneficial are in cases where it
is difficult to collect evidence.

For example, narrowly-defined populations including very young children, high-risk
pregnant women, and patients with extremely rare diseases are not usually included
in drug clinical trials because the numbers of patients might be too small, the
patients may be unable or unwilling to provide informed consent, or the situation
may be too unstable. Nonetheless, circumstances may arise where these patients
must receive off-label prescriptions for their care.
Id. at 238.
172
Id. at 228.
173
Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review of Proposals to Improve Access and
Affordability of Prescription Drugs, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 311, 324 (2010).
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Id. at 324.
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See id. at 324, 328.
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may be dangerous or not based on complete evidence demonstrating
efficacy.178 The FDA has a legitimate, compelling interest in protecting
the public health with off-label prescribing by ensuring that companies do
not transmit false or misleading information or encourage such prescribing
without an underlying medical basis.179 Drug manufacturers should not be
prohibited from promoting off-label use if the use is then “demonstrated to
be scientifically reasonable through federal[] . . . research.”180 Efficacy
information for new drug approval is gathered in a very condition-specific
process that results in a FDA decision on whether a drug is not just
efficacious or safe enough to be allowed on the market, but whether these
elements justify approval for the drug’s intended use.181 This evidence is
gathered in adequate and well-controlled studies.182
The FDA approved Avastin to treat patients with metastatic carcinoma
of the colon or rectum in 2004, and to treat colon or rectal cancer and nonsmall cell lung cancer in 2006.183 In 2007, one scientist experimented with
a modified form of Avastin to treat neovascular age-related macular
degeneration, a disorder of the retina causing vision loss.184 Following this
off-label experimentation, Genentech was uncertain of how to
communicate with physicians about the off-label use.185 From 2004 to
2007, Genentech struggled with their position as interest in the off-label
use of Avastin increased, but the company did not know whether it could
lawfully communicate with physicians regarding the safety information of
the off-label use.186 This is because the FDA’s interest in protecting the
public health empowers it to prevent companies from transmitting false or
misleading information and encouraging off-label prescribing of drugs at
the risk of civil or criminal liability.187
The problem this example illustrates is that the FDA does not consider
whether or not scientific and medical information provided by a drug
company is truthful and not misleading, or whether or not physicians
prescribe a drug in a medically appropriate manner; the FDA is only
178
Kesselheim, supra note 159, at 229; see also Salbu, supra note 163, at 187 (“The regulations
are intended to ensure that the drugs and their promotional literature contain accurate and complete
information regarding approved use and risks. Although the ultimate goal is consumer protection,
prescription drug labels today are aimed at physicians, who have held a longstanding position in
American jurisprudence as ‘learned intermediaries’ between manufacturers and users.”).
179
Osborn, supra note 157, at 307.
180
See Kesselheim, supra note 159, at 229 (questioning the propriety of the restrictions the FDA
places on manufacturers).
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Id. at 231.
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Osborn, supra note 157, at 336.
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concerned with whether the indication in question has been approved. If it
has not, and a company like Genentech communicates or conveys
information to physicians on an unapproved indication, then the FDA will
conduct an investigation and prosecute the company.188 It is unclear under
what circumstances a manufacturer will be permitted to express an opinion
on off-label uses of its products without being subject to a billion-dollar
investigation.189 Drug manufacturers should be able to communicate
truthful, non-misleading scientific and medical information that comports
with sound medical practice.190
Restricting off-label marketing ends a potential source of costcontainment. By subjecting all potential uses of a drug to FDA approval,
the number of clinical trials conducted is increased, as well as the amount
spent in R&D expenses.191 These costs are then passed to consumers
through price increases, making treatments even more difficult to obtain.192
These resources could be saved or more appropriately used by the FDA if
off-label treatments could be marketed without seeking FDA approval. By
focusing instead on expediting approval of new drugs, the amount of
money spent by the FDA could be reduced or spent processing new drug
applications more quickly, benefiting consumers by expediting patient
access to new treatments.193
Knowledge is more readily collected and shared within the scientific
and medical community without FDA intervention. Patients expect their
physician to have the ability to learn of the most current scientifically valid
information and incorporate it into the way they treat their patients. 194
Manufactures are in the best position to keep physicians informed about
the latest research findings that encourage “new and beneficial off-label
uses of their products.”195 Patients deserve to receive “better, potentially
life-saving treatments before the completion of the lengthy approval
process.”196 In fact, drug companies frame the issue of off-label marketing
in terms of whether they should be denied the freedom to provide doctors
with “truthful information.”197 The result of the FDA’s policies is that
doctors and other health care providers may not be adequately informed. If
the risks of treatment are clearly disclosed, reduced regulation by the FDA
would increase social utility and benefit patients.
188
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO FDA REGULATION
The FDA has a policy “to ensure that cancer sufferers only employ the
so-called ‘proven methods’ and are not deceived into using non-approved
therapies that can be [totally] ineffective and potentially dangerous.”198
However, this removes a patient’s autonomy to select a potentially
life-saving treatment option, rations care through insurance companies’
denial of coverage for these treatments, increases costs of drugs to patients
and of development to manufacturers, and reduces the information
available to physicians to help their patients make informed decisions.
Together, these problems indicate that the current system is inadequate and
an alternative system of regulation for cancer drugs like Avastin should be
implemented.
The FDA should no longer serve as a public gatekeeper for new cancer
treatments, but should instead have the role of certifying these products as
“safe and effective.”199 They should no longer have control of the
licensing of cancer drugs, but should act as a certification agency that
offers advice on which drugs to use and which to avoid.200 Once initial
clinical trials have been completed, patients and physicians should have the
ability to choose a drug.201 This would not only promote individual patient
autonomy, but would also reduce fraud in the drug market. By denying
approval for Avastin, the price of Avastin skyrockets for those without
insurance to cover its cost. This in turn permits those producing
counterfeit Avastin to have a market for their products, which are more
affordable to those paying out-of-packet. Such was the case where fake
Avastin made it to the U.S. market in February, shortly after the approval
for Avastin was removed by the FDA.202
The FDA should protect the public from treatments that have not
passed any clinical trials, but should not be responsible for denying
approval for drugs where it lacks the individualized calculation of whether
patients have risk factors for particular treatments.203 Three alternative
systems that could effectively regulate Avastin include: (1) shared decision
making by patients and physicians; (2) regulation by private organizations;
and (3) indirect regulation by insurance payors.
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Horwin, supra note 109, at 695. “FDA representatives have testified that they must play a
crucial role in determining what drugs are made available so patients are ‘protected from untested and
unproven products.’” Id. at 696.
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Id. at 4.
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Id. at 23.
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Benoit Faucon & Jeanne Whalen, Fake Avastin Took Murky Path to U.S., WALL ST. J., Apr. 5,
2012, at A1.
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A. Shared Decision Making
The first way that Avastin could be regulated subsequent to modifying
the FDA’s role from regulation to certification is through a process of
shared decision making by patients and physicians. Experts have called
shared decision making the “ideal model of treatment decision making in
the medical [context].”204 Shared decision making reduces the imbalance
between physicians and patients by increasing the information patients
receive as well as their sense of having authority and control over their
own treatment decisions.205 Support for shared decision making has risen
as a result of informed consent being considered a patient right, the
principle of informed choice gaining support, the consumer rights
movement, and the changing nature of the medical practice from one of
acute care to one of chronic care.206
Shared decision making is a process that occurs between a physician
and patient, where both parties take steps to participate in the process of
choosing a treatment.207 Essentially, both parties engage in information
and value sharing and ultimately both parties agree on the final treatment
decision.208 Physicians and patients participate in the treatment decision
making process when they take several steps: first, the physician
establishes a conducive atmosphere for the patient to feel their views about
different treatment options are valued and needed; second, the physician
elicits the patient’s preferences so that the treatment options considered
comport with their values; third, the physician explains the various
treatment options, risks, and benefits to the patient in a clear and unbiased
fashion; fourth, physicians help patients weigh the risks and benefits of
each option and make sure the information they are basing their opinions
on is accurate; and finally, the physician participates in the decision
making by sharing his treatment recommendation and affirming the
patient’s treatment decision.209
The practice of medicine has changed over the last two to three
204
Cathy Charles, Amiram Gafni & Tim Whelan, Shared Decision-Making in the Medical
Encounter: What Does it Mean? (or it Takes at Least Two to Tango), 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 681, 681
(1997).
205
Id. at 682.
206
Id. at 681–82.
207
Id. at 685–86. Several physicians may participate in this process with a single patient, which
could raise increased uncertainty and confusion for the patient if multiple treatment options are
suggested. Id. at 685.
208
Id. at 687–88; see id. at 688 (“The test of a shared decision (as distinct from the decisionmaking process) is if both parties agree on the treatment option. This does not mean that both parties
are necessarily convinced that this is the best possible treatment for this patient, but rather that both
endorse it as the treatment to implement . . . . Through mutual acceptance, both parties share
responsibility for the final decision.”).
209
Id. at 687.
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decades, resulting in a shift to physicians managing illnesses instead of
curing diseases.210 In these instances, the physician-patient relationship
can potentially last for many years or even a lifetime. The changing nature
of the practice of medicine requires that physicians now work closely with
patients to choose the best drugs to treat their individual condition.211 This
process takes time, continuous monitoring, and adjustment of drug types
and levels. For life-threatening conditions such as cancer, this process is
thought to work best if both patients and physicians participate in key
treatment decision points and selecting medication regimens, as the wrong
decision may result in severe consequences for the patient.212 Since the
choice of the best treatment for a particular patient requires value
judgments, this decision is best made by patients and physicians.
The current problem is that a physician’s experience, knowledge and
expertise can be trumped by the FDA when they do not approve treatments
like Avastin for new conditions.213 A physician who has used a drug like
Avastin becomes an expert on its application and use, even where the
treatment is new and not routinely used.214 One attorney made the case
against FDA bureaucrats when he said, “Your physician may recommend
an experimental drug, the corporate sponsor of that drug may agree to
supply it, and the clinical investigator may agree to administer it, but if the
FDA disagrees, you are out of luck.”215 Not all persons with cancer have
the same circumstances surrounding their condition. It is therefore
inappropriate for the FDA to choose the best cancer treatment for
individuals because they are unaware of an individual’s unique medical
history.216
The FDA takes the position that cancer patients may choose a harmful
treatment or receive a harmful batch of medicine and therefore they must
be protected from making wrong decisions; but this argument ignores the
fact that a patient’s physician is the best medical decision maker to assist
individuals in these choices.217 A physician may not be able to monitor
drug production and distribution, but physicians are trained and licensed to
give diagnostic and therapeutic assistance to their patients. Why then
should a paternalistic government stand in the way of them rendering the
best advice and treatments for their patient’s needs? Patients should have
the ability not just to choose their physician, but to expect that their
physician will use his best judgment to help them choose the optimal
210
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treatment for their particular needs.
There is no evidence that patients
and physicians are more likely than the FDA to make mistakes if their
cancer options go beyond surgery, radiation, chemotherapy and hormone
therapy.219
It is often the case that a patient with advanced cancer is willing to try
any treatment, no matter what risks are involved, as a last ditch effort to try
and save her own life. It makes sense for us to have a procedure in place
for these patients to exercise their right to take on any risk to try and save
their lives. Once a physician determines that a patient has reached a point
in her disease where traditional treatments will be fruitless and she will
otherwise die from her cancer, that physician should be able to prescribe
Avastin so long as the patient is fully informed of all the risks involved.
The FDA should clear the prescription of Avastin for such cases and
permit issuance of the drug to those who have consented to the risks. The
FDA could label the drug with these risks and as not having full approval.
This would maintain the FDA’s role as a protector of public health while
promoting complete patient autonomy and informed consent.
Shared decision making can also be achieved through a bill like the
Access to Medical Treatment Act (“AMTA”).220 This bill, if passed,
would “permit an individual to be treated by a health care practitioner with
any method of medical treatment such individual requests, and for other
purposes.”221 It would give the individual the right to be treated with
medical treatments that are not approved, certified, or licensed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.222 It would allow cancer
sufferers to choose the most appropriate medical treatment for their
condition with the help of their physician.223 However, AMTA will not be
passed so long as the FDA is permitted to trump the medical decisions of a
patient’s physician where cancer treatments are not “proven” by the
FDA.224
AMTA takes a liberal approach to drug regulation by focusing on
patient autonomy rather than FDA paternalism. If passed, it would allow
cancer patients to consult with their physicians to discuss a variety of
medical treatments, including Avastin.225 Under AMTA, a patient could
218
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decisions for everyone, the FDA cannot play the role of physician to the half million cancer patients
who will die this year.” Id.
220
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receive a treatment so long as a physician had no reason to conclude the
treatment was dangerous to the patient. This would permit a patient to
receive a treatment like Avastin in the early stages of development or
before it underwent any clinical trials if the patient was fully informed and
provided consent.226 This would dramatically increase patient autonomy
under the FDA, making shared decision making possible for those
suffering from cancer.
AMTA would also allow drug manufacturers to market drugs directly
to patients and physicians without FDA approval.227 Drugs would still be
regulated, but this would be accomplished by physicians, tort liability, and
market factors, rather than by the FDA. 228 Physicians would take on an
increased role in protecting their patients from harmful drugs and
treatments by becoming informed of the alternatives and shielding their
patients from harmful drugs.229 Patients could also use the tort system
against manufacturers who put out harmful products and against doctors
who breached the standard of medical care.230 Lastly, the drug market
would regulate manufacturers as harmful or ineffective drugs would not be
profitable and would be forced out by drugs that are more effective.231
The FDA is ill-suited to regulate cancer drugs like Avastin because of
the threat raised to patient autonomy. While shared decision making is but
one alternative to the current system, it is a preferable one because it
allows patients and physicians to evaluate individual circumstances and
make informed choices about the best possible treatments, something the
FDA does not have the knowledge or resources to do.
B. Voluntary Private Organizations
Another way to regulate cancer drugs like Avastin is through voluntary
private organizations. This type of system is favored by those holding a
presumption against the use of government power to regulate autonomous
individuals.232 The government must justify asserting power over
individual decisions where a loss of personal liberty is involved. This
burden is met where the government is trying to prevent harms that
individuals may inflict on others; however, the threshold to justify
government action is higher where the potential harm of an individual’s
decision is to himself.233 If one starts with a strong presumption against
226
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government regulation of autonomous decisions, the FDA does not have a
sufficient reason to overcome the liberty interest of individuals in choosing
for themselves the best treatment option.
Following this presumption, government coercion is not justified in
the cancer context, where private groups can process information more
efficiently for consumers at lower costs than the FDA.234 Professional
intermediaries already administer cancer drugs, even with the FDA in
place as a public gatekeeper.235 Voluntary methods of regulating cancer
drugs will be more successful than the FDA because “[d]ecentralized
bodies are more likely to make sound[] decisions.”236 The FDA is inferior
to the private systems already in place, and such systems can advance
when drug companies are permitted to engage in the distribution of
information created by independent sources, something currently
prohibited.237
Voluntary organizations that deal with oncology already exist; patients
and physicians use them to connect to the manufacturers of cancer drugs.238
Voluntary organizations are usually nonprofit organizations that “collect,
digest, and interpret material for their members in areas where there is an
information shortfall.”239 Physicians benefit from the information these
organizations communicate and the best practice standards they set.240
Private organizations compete to provide the best information. Physicians
may “use information from such organizations” and then “report their own
experiences [with a drug] back” to the organization, allowing for an
ongoing updating of information that physicians can compare.241 The FDA
does not have a similar means of collecting and disseminating information;
the fact that “the FDA lacks the resources [and] expertise . . . to evaluate
cutting-edge . . . technologies” causes the regulatory power of the FDA to
exceed its ability to discharge its obligations.242
The FDA should grant accelerated regulatory approval for cancer
drugs like Avastin, especially when they have demonstrated efficacy for
other indications. There should be reduced evidentiary requirements to
justify certification from the FDA, which in turn would reduce the amount
of money the FDA would have to spend.243 Such accelerated approval
234
Id. at 8 (“No grant of monopoly power is justified if private groups are able to provide better
information to potential end users at lower costs than the state.”).
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should then be followed by post-approval monitoring by private
organizations for adverse effects. “[M]anufacturers would [then] have an
accelerated pathway they could use to discuss [the benefits of the] off-label
uses of their products” and disseminate information to consumers in need
of life-saving therapies.244 Private organizations, unlike the FDA, have the
resources to efficiently update information received from physicians using
Avastin for off-label uses. It is inefficient for the FDA to continue
regulating where a private body can achieve the same, if not better, results.
C. Insurance Payors
The last possibility for regulating Avastin subsequent to modifying the
FDA’s role is through insurance payors. Under current law, the FDA
cannot prohibit physicians from prescribing drugs off-label. Insurers,
however, are able to discourage such applications by denying payment for
these uses.245 Insurance plans dissuade physicians from prescribing offlabel drugs by requiring evidence of the use’s quality and efficacy before
providing payment for that use.246 It is undisputed that some off-label
prescribing can provide important benefits to patients.247 Since physicians
have the ability to practice medicine according to their best medical
judgment, “there are inherent risks attached to” the unregulated practice of
off-label prescribing.248 If the private market can address these risks better
than the government, then regulation should be left to the private market.
This makes sense where “[t]he FDA has limited resources to monitor the
11,000 drugs on the market,”249 let alone to regulate off-label applications.
If necessary, states could influence off-label drug use by requiring
insurers to pay for off-label uses of certain drugs for which they would
normally deny coverage. States also have the authority to ban off-label
uses in their efforts to promote public health.250 Since the federal
government is without authority in the practice of medicine, it does not
make sense for the federal government to regulate off-label uses of drugs
like Avastin. A system is already in place for insurance payors to regulate
this market indirectly by denying coverage for drugs that lack evidence of
quality and efficacy, supplemented by the states’ authority to establish offlabel mandates in line with their policies.251
244
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The best alternative to FDA regulation is a model that is flexible
enough to allow physicians to prescribe drugs off-label where it is the best
treatment for a patient’s condition, while containing the possibility of
patient harm.252 Insurance payors, in their role as reimbursement agents,
are capable of “discouraging harmful and non-beneficial off-label drug
use” because they have an “incentive to eliminate unnecessary drug
us[e].”253 Regulation at this level is achieved at a lower price because
insurance payors already engage in this process. Insurance payor
regulation of cancer drugs is thus a solution that promotes the autonomy of
patients and physicians in choosing drugs like Avastin when they are the
optimal treatment, while decreasing the risk of patient harm by not
reimbursing unnecessary drug usage.
The effectiveness of the insurance payor as a regulator of drugs is
undeniable. Physicians already make off-label prescribing decisions based
on payor reimbursement decisions.254 If such a model already induces
physicians to follow the standard of care, why should the government
continue to regulate in this area? FDA oversight is duplicative where
insurance payor regulation can facilitate evidence-based medicine at lower
costs.255 Most insurance payors require a showing of safety and efficacy
for off-label drug use before providing reimbursement. Almost all payors
use medical evidence in these decisions.256 This alternative gives
physicians and drug manufacturers a compelling interest in providing
scientific evidence of a drug’s capabilities before prescribing it off-label.
Those who did not produce such evidence would face the risk of nonpayment by insurance payors; such a prospect guides them in practicing
evidence-based medicine so funds can be administered to them.257
The FDA approval process for cancer drugs like Avastin has strict
requirements and is incredibly costly. The evidence required for payor
reimbursement of off-label prescriptions is more relaxed than this process,
but still guides medical decision making when physicians consider the
safety of an off-label use and their chances of reimbursement.258 “In light
of [insurance] payor’s reliance on [actual] medical evidence when making
reimbursement decisions for off-label [uses],” the need for costly clinical
trials is reduced, which in turn “lower[s] the cost of evidence-based offlabel prescribing.”259 This model not only reduces costs for an already
252
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overburdened government agency, but creates the flexibility needed to
achieve physician and patient autonomy in medical decision making.
Once the federal government’s regulatory role is reduced and the
private industry takes over the bulk of the regulation of cancer drugs, states
can replace federal oversight where public health or policy issues are
raised. For example, states may choose to mandate private insurers to
provide or deny coverage for off-label prescribing. In this way, the
government can prevent insurance companies from denying reimbursement
for off-label uses that patients need to treat their medical conditions or can
discourage off-label prescribing.260 According to one researcher, “[m]ore
than thirty states [require] at least some [insurance] coverage for off-label
uses of drugs.”261 Such mandates enable states to compel insurance payors
to cover certain costs when their cost-containment policies would harm
patient’s health needs. This measure would protect against health care
rationing because insurance payors would no longer rely on the decisions
of the FDA to deny coverage for potentially life-saving treatments; rather,
insurance payors would be held accountable by the states with an interest
in and the ultimate authority to promote the health and safety of the
population.
V. CONCLUSION
The FDA claims that it is “committed to providing early access to
promising, but unproven, medical treatments for seriously ill patients who
might otherwise have no hope.”262 However, the FDA contradicts itself
when it states that no matter how compelling a case may be, “the cost of
providing individual access [to care] cannot be to sacrifice the system that
ultimately establishes whether therapies are safe and effective.”263 Such
conflicting statements highlight the FDA’s limitations: it is incapable of
accomplishing its goals of both promoting public health through innovative
treatments and protecting people from unproven therapies.
Since the FDA does not have sufficient resources to address both
issues, it often fails in its first goal by sacrificing innovation and drug
development to maintain the integrity of the agency. By removing the
FDA as the sole regulatory authority for the approval and licensing of
cancer drugs like Avastin, this problem can be avoided. The FDA
continues to protect the public health by promoting drugs that pass Phase I
clinical trials, but does not stand in the way of patient autonomy and drug
development by engaging in subsequent approval of cancer drugs for all
260
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potential uses. More responsibility will be placed on patients who desire
these treatments and the physicians who gather the necessary information
to prescribe them. This is desirable in a country based on the democratic
principle of free choice.
Although the FDA has an important role as a protector of the health
and safety of the public at large, the solution proposed by this Note does
not detract from this role nor does it challenge FDA authority in its
traditional areas of regulation. This proposal merely recognizes that in an
era where rapid development of new and promising drug therapies is
prevalent, the FDA does not have adequate resources to keep up. This role
should properly be transferred to patients, physicians, voluntary
organizations, and insurance payors who can better bear the burden of
information gathering, engaging in public discourse/debate, disseminating
test results, and holding drug manufacturers accountable for the products
they send into the market. For these reasons, Congress should modify the
role of the FDA and allow the market to take control in the regulation of
cancer drugs like Avastin.
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